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APPEALS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES
(As Viewed by the Petitioner's Attorney)
LESTER HARRIS*
WHEN A WORKMAN covered by the provisions of
the Florida Workman's Compensation Law' suffers
injury during the period of his employment, he may sub-
mit to the Industrial Commission the question whether
the injury arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment. If the findings are favorable, he is entitled to com-
pensation whether or not the employer has been at fault,
intentionally or negligently; because it is the purpose of
the act to substitute insurance for common law tort lia-
bility.2 To the extent that the determination of these issues
depends on findings of fact, the deputy commissioner, who
hears the evidence, must resolve conflicts in favor of one
party or the other. In this, he is aided by certain statutory
presumptions in favor of the workman.3 Both parties are
protected against abuse by the deputy commissioner, first
by an appeal4 to the Industrial Commission, and second,
by an appeaP to the courts of law, which is t matter of
right.
If the deputy commissioner resolves a question of fact
upon conflicting testimony in favor of either party, he may
be reversed by the Circuit Court. The case is not re-
manded, but the Circuit Court substitutes its findings of
fact for those of the deputy commissioner. This is sur-
prising, because the Circuit Court does not enter upon a
*Member of the Orlando, Florida, Bar. B.S., Bucknell University;
LL.B., John B. Stetson University.
I Laws 1935, c. 17481; F.S. 1941, c. 440.
2 See Adams J., in Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla.
30, 16 So. 2d 342 (1944). "The purpose of the act is to shoulder on
industry the expense incident to the hazards of industry."
3 F.S. 1941, § 440.26.
4 F.S. 1941, § 440.25.
S.S. 1141, § 440.27.
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trial de novo, and must depend upon the record made be-
fore the deputy commissioner.
If the Circuit Court abuses this power, the injured party
is theoretically protected by an appeal to the Supreme
Court. The obstacles to a successful appeal, however, pre-
sented by certain rulings of the Supreme Court, together
with the expense and delay which an appeal involves, make
it virtually impossible for a workman, who has recovered
before the commission on a conflict in testimony which
reasonable men might resolve either way, to guard against
an arbitrary reversal by the Circuit Court. These cases
frequently occur in the experience of those dealing with
compensation cases, and it appears advisable to examine
the law and to make certain recommendations for its im-
provement.
Throughout this study, the purposes of the Workmen's
Compensation Law must be borne in mind. Statutes of this
type substitute a system of insurance for tort liability
where a workman is injured in the course of a productive
activity. The Industrial Revolution, in which power ma-
chinery and great factories replaced hand tools and the
domestic workshop of an earlier era, produced conditions
in the relationship of employer and employee not known
to the common law. When a manufacturer employed one
or two persons and personally supervised their 'work, it
was unrealistic to hold the employer liable for injury un-
less it resulted from an intended or negligent wrong, and
reasonable to hold that the employee shared in the risks
of the enterprise. As power machinery exacted a higher
toll in life and limb, and the factory removed the employee
further from control of the place and conditions of his
work, the common law defenses of assumption of risk and
the fellow servant rule operated to increase the burden of
the workingman. Workmen's Compensation statutes were
the outgrowth of a demand that this burden be removed
from the shoulders of the workman and transferred to
6 'Wambaugb, "WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS: THEIR
THEORY AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY" (1911), 25 Hamv. L.
R. 129. New York passed the first such law in 1910 and ten other states
the following year. The article cited is therefore valuable for a contem-
porary statement of the purposes of the act. See also note 2, supra.
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the social order which benefited by the increased produc-
tion. The risk of large scale production is therefore calcu-
lated and passed on to the consumer as part of the price.
The workman and his dependents are the principal bene-
ficiaries of the act. The Supreme Court of Florida has
ruled that the act "should be constructed liberally, and
all doubts resolved in the claimant's favor."8 Not only has
the act sought to assure relief, it has sought to expedite
payment. "The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation
Act was to make available promptly medical attention,
hospitalization, and compensation commensurate with the
injury."9
In the action sounding in tort which the statute replaces,
the employee was required to prove fault on the part of
the employer and to negative the defenses of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and negligence of a fellow
servant. ' In the procedure under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law, fault of the employer is not an issue,1' and
fault of the employee is an issue only to the extent that
injury may result primarily from the intoxication of the
employee, his willful intent to injure or to kill himself, or
his refusal to follow safety rules or to employ safety
appliances.' 2 There are statutory presumptions in favor of
the claimant on each of these issues. 3 The questions of
fact to be determined relate principally to the extent of
7 "This is only partly true. In every instance the employee bears part
of the loss . . . so that no employee shall lose one of the primary
incentives to avoid accidental injuries." Carl B. Smith, Chairman,
Florida Industrial Commission, in preface to official publication, "The
Workmen's Compensation Act, as Amended, with Annotations," 194T.
R Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103, 196
So. 495 (1940). See also: S. H. Kress Co. et al. v. Burkes, 153 Fla. 868.
16 So. 2d 106 (1944), McCall v. Motor Fuel Carriers, 155 Fla. 854, 22
So. 2d 153 (1945), Leon County v. Sauls, 151 Fla. 171, 9 So. 2d 461
11942), C.F. Wheeler Co. v. Pullins, 152 Fla. 96, 11 So. 2d 303 (1942).
' Weathers v. Gauthen, 152 Fla. 420, 12 So. 2d 294 (1943).
10 These defenses are preserved if the employee elects not to operate
under the law. F.S. 1941,.§ 440.07.
1 "The act removes all question of negligence, assumption of risk or
wrong-doing on the part of the employer." Adams, J., in Protecti
Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So. 2d 342 (1944).
12 F.S. 1941, § 440.09 (c).
i F .S. 1941, § 440.26,
17
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the injuries and to whether they were incurred in and
arose out of the course of the employment.
The administrative procedure by which claims are han-
dled by the Industrial Commission, is prompt and efficient,
and gives full support to the purposes of the act.. The
claim is placed before a deputy commissioner, who takes
action immediately.'4 An appeal lies to the full commission,
which is required to act promptly.5 In the hearing before
the deputy commission, strict rules of pleading and evi-
dence are avoided, and the injured workman is not bound
by technical requirements of proof.'6 On appeal to the
full board, the findings of fact made by the deputy com-
missioner are presumably accorded the weight given a
jury verdict or the findings of a chancellor if supported
by competent evidence.
When an appellate body accords conclusiveness to the
findings of a trier of fact, full recognition is given to the
principle that appearance and demeanor of witnesses are
factors from which credibility is determined. In Work-
men's Compensation cases, the visible condition of the
claimant is to be weighed with the professional opinion of
physicians in determining the extent of disability. An
appellate body cannot evaluate these elements from the
record. Any danger of abuse of power by the trier of fact
is offset, by the requirement that his findings must be
supported by substantial and competent evidence.
When an appeal is taken from the Florida Industrial
Commission to the Circuit Court, it might be expected that
the appellate tribunal would review only questions of law
and would treat as conclusive the findings of fact made
by the commission, if supported by competent evidence.
The language of the statute'7 and the opinions of the Su-
14 The claim may be filed at any time after the first seven days of
disability or after death. Notice is given the employer within ten days.
A hearing follows ten days' notice, and the deputy commissioner must
determine the dispute within 20 days. A hearing is had on application
of an interested party; otherwise the case is investigated by the deputy.
P.S. 1941, §§ 440.25 (1) (2) and (3).
1s F.S. 1941, § 440.25 (4).
6 F.S, 1941, . 440.29.
17 "if not in ,ecordanee with Inw, the compensation order or award
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preme Court" favor such an interpretation. However,
when an appeal is taken from the Circuit Court to the
Supreme Court, the argument that the Circuit Court did
not accord proper weight to the findings of the commis-
sion, is not available to the appellant. Instead, it is held
that the findings of the Circuit Court will not be reversed
if there is evidence to support them.'9
may be appealed." Similar language in the Federal Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Act is construed to limit appeals to questions of
law. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1938).
For cases from this district holding the deputy commissioner's findings
conclusive in maritime cases, see. Southern Shipping Co. v. Lawson,
5 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Fla. 1933), Suwanee Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Lawson,
63 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Fla- 1945). Compare the wording of the federal
statute: "If not in accordance with law, a compensation order may be
suspended or set aside-through injunction proceeding-instituted in
the federal district court."
IS For cases holding that on appeal from the order of the Industrial
Commission, the Circuit Court should give the findings of the Com-
mission the same weight which a chancellor would properly give to
findings of law and fact by a Special Master appointed by the court, see
Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Massey, 145 Fla. 56, 198 So. 802 (1940),
Firestone Auto Supply Service Stores v. Bullard, 141 Fla. 282, 192 So.
865 (1940). See also Dixie Laundry v. Wantzell, 145 Fla. 569, 200 So. 860
(1941), Moorer v. Putnam Lumber Co., 152 Fla..520, 12 So. 2d 370
(1943), City of St. Petersburg v. Mosedale, 146 Fla. 784, 1 So. 2d 878
(1941); Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472,
18 So. 2d 251 (1944); Haller Bros. Packing Co. v. Lewis, 155 Fla. 430,
20 So. 2d 385 (1945).
19 "The Circuit Judge shall give to the findings of the commission
about the same weight and consideration which the chancellor should
give to the findings of law and fact by a Special Master appointed by
the court for that purpose. When, however, appeal is taken from the
order of the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
shall give to the findings of fact by the Circuit Judge that degree of
consideration, force and effect which the Supreme Court gives to the
findings of a chancellor in an ordinary Chancery suit, which means
that if the Circuit Court has acted upon the record made before the
Commission, great weight will be given findings of the Circuit Court.
It follows that the burden in cases appealed to this court is upon the
appellant to show clearly that the Circuit Court has arrived at an
erroneous or unwarranted conclusion." Buford, J., in Firestone Auto
Supply Service Stores et. al. v. Bullard, 141 Fla. 282, 192 So. 865 (1940).
See also Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Massey, 145 Fla. 56, 198 So. 802
(1940); Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Allrook, 153 la. 829, 16 So.
2d 61 (1943), Keller Bros. Packing Co. v. Kendricks, 155 Fla. 430, 20
So. 2d 38 (1945): Florida. Forest & Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla,
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For example, if there is a conflict in the testimony ad-
duced before the master as to whether the claimant's
admitted disability is the result of an industrial accident
or a disease contracted elsewhere, and a reasonable man
might believe the professional opinion of the claimant's
physicians as readily as that of the employer's, the court
should not overrule the deputy commissioner.20 A chancel-
lor reviewing the findings of a master should not reverse
under those circumstances. If the Circuit Court does re-
verse, however, the propriety of the action cannot be re-
viewed in the Supreme Court because, from the hypothesis,
there is evidence to support the Circuit Court's substituted
finding.
This paradox appears to be the result of an historical
accident in the development of the law. When the Work-
men's Compensation Law was originally adopted, an ap-
peal tolthe Circuit Court was followed by a trial de novo3'
This procedure was in accord with that followed in many
other states, and it resulted no doubt from the view for-
merly held, that to permit an administrative commission
to adjudicate a case or controversy between parties was in
violation of the constitutional allocation of judicial power
to the courts. This view yielded in time to the necessity
of relieving courts of the burden of much minor litigation,
such as the establishment of the controverted facts in com-
pensation cases, and was supplanted by a view that
constitutional requirements could be satisfied if an appeal
lay to the courts to correct errors of law.22
472,. 18 So. 2d 251 (1944); Orange Homes Co. v. Burnette, 29 So. 2d
449 (Fla. 1947); Intercontinental Aircraft Corp. v. Pickton, 154 Fla.
8, 16 So. 2d 292 (1944); DuVal Engineering & Contracting Co. v. John-
son, 154 Fla. 9, 16 So. 2d 290 (1944).
20 "Sec. 26 (440.26) of the act declares what presumptions should
obtain in proceedings for the enforcement of claim under the act and
does not include the presumption of correctness of the Commissioner's
findings." Buford, J., in Firestone Auto Supply & Service Stores v.
Bullard, 141 Fla. 282, 192 So. 865 (1940). Note that in this case the
decision favored the workman.
21 For history, see note, F.S.A. § 440.27, and also, South Atlantic
Steamship Co. of Delaware v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675 (1939).
22 "Some governmental functions that are not essentially legislative
or jidfral pot cr.g may by statute be conferred upon administrative
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The Florida statute was amended in 1937 in. keeping
with this trend. It provided for an appeal from the order
or award of the full commission "if not in accordance with
law", and that the appeal "shall be heard upon the record".
Obviously the trial de novo was eliminated; but it was
argued that if this were 'an appeal, and a review only
of the law, then the act violated a specific provision of the
Florida Constitution which made final all appeals to the
Circuit Court from inferior tribunals. In what must be
admitted to be a praiseworthy attitude, the court construed
the act liberally to sustain it, and ruled that a claim for
workmen's compensation becomes a lawsuit for the first
time when it reaches the Circuit Court.23
The Supreme Court proceeded to elaborate its ruling
by showing how the appeal might be regarded as an ori-
ginal proceeding without a trial de novo. It likened the
hearing in the Circuit Court to the action of a chancellor
in equity taking action on the report of a master. Tradi-
tionally, the hearing by a master is extra-judicial, and the
analogy is helpful. Equity practice requires that the chan-
cellor accord to the findings of the master that respect
which the fact that the master has seen and heard the
witresses demands. Neither the master nor the Commis-
sion should be reversed unless clearly wrong. Formula-
tion of the rule that on appeal the Circuit Court should
not be reversed for failure to accord such respect to the
findings of fact by the Industrial Commission, but only
if there is no evidence to support the substituted findings
ufficers. boards or comlmissioners. to be exercised within appropriate
statutory limitations ...such a state policy ...is becoming more and
more essential to efficient government, since the processes of the legis-
lative and judicial departments are not designed to perform the constant
and expeditious functions necessary to expanding business, commercial,
industrial, and social relations." Whitfield, J., in South Atlantic, S.S.
Co. of Delaware v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675 (1939). See also
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1938).
23 South Atlantic S.S. Co. of Delaware v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So.
675 (1939). "Such proceedings may not appear in the judicial depart-
ment of the State Government as a judicial 'case' until they are brought
to the Circuit Court by appeals; therefore the 'case' may fairly be re-
garded as 'originating' in the circuit court through a statutory appeal
. .. as it would . . .by injunction, certiorari, or other original writ."
Whitfield, J.
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of the Circuit Court, the Supreme Court apparently over-
looked an important distinction. When it reviews the
findings of a chancellor who has heard the evidence him-
self, the court treats his findings as conclusive if supported
by legally sufficient evidence; but when it reviews the find-
ings of a chancellor who has acted upon the report of a
master, the question is whether the chancellor erred in
finding the master's findings clearly against the weight
of the evidence.2
The rule is subject to criticism on another score. If the
Circuit Court acts adversely to the claimant, the latter
may be deprived of benefits expressly conferred by the
statute. As to the procedure on appeal, the Supreme Court
has said that "the burden is on appellant to show clearly
that the Circuit Court has arrived at an erroneous con-
clusion". 25 If that is the case, the policy of liberal construc-
tion formulated by the Supreme Court, and the statutory
presumptions which favor the claimant on the principal
issues, are lost.2
It must be noted in fairness that none of the reported
cases involve a situation where the Circuit Court has re-
versed findings of fact which were resolved favorably to
the claimant by the Industrial Commission.27 The reported
cases are either appeals by the employer or appeals by a
claimant whose award was reversed on a point of law. It
may confidently be expected that the Supreme Court, if
such a situation were presented, would examine the issues
24 Groom v. Ocala Plumbing & Electric Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243
1911), Kent v. Knowles, 101 Fla. 1375, 133 So. 315 (1937). McAdow
v. Smith, 127 Fla. 29, 172 So. 448 (1937); and see Knomar. "FinridR
Chancery Pleading & Practice" (1939), 303. 453.
25 See Buford, J., in Firestone Auto Supply Service Stores et al. v.
Bullard, 141 Fla. 282, 192 So. 865 (1940), and cases cited in note 19
above.
26 "Section 26 (F.S. 1941, § 440.26) of the act does not include the
presumption of correctness of the commission's findings." Buford, J., in
Firestone Auto Supply Service Stores et al.'v, Bullard, supra, note 25.
27 Since on appeal to the Florida Supreme court, the case is restyled,
a cursory glance at the cases cited in the notes show that the employer
is usually the appellant. In each case cited where that does not appear,
either claimant failed to establish his claim before the deputy commis-
sioner, or the reversal was on a question of law.
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in the light of its liberal attitude and the purposes of the
statute, and would be more critical than heretofore of the
action of the Circuit Court. The absence of such cases must
not be construed, however, as an assurance that the prob-
lem never arises. Rather it is a fact to which the author
testifies, that the risk and expense of an appeal make it
impossible for the claimant to obtain relief, and that many
eases of this type are dropped when the Circuit Court has
ruled adversely.
For one thing, an appeal takes time and money. The
attorney represents a client who, as a general rule, can
pay him only in the event of final victory. He runs the
risk of spending a year in litigation, making two trips to
Tallahassee to argue the case, and expending his own mon-
ies in railroad fares, hotel bills, stenographic costs, and
meals away from home, all on a mere contingency. In
addition, the claimant's attorney faces the possibility of
being required to pay heavy medical bills, because physi-
cians are loathe to spend time and work on indigent pa-
tients unless the attorney guarantees the costs.
Even if the case is won in the Supreme Court, the
attorney's fees must be approved by the Commission or
the Court. ' Claimant's recovery is limited by the terms
of the act to a portion of his wages, and that being a mere
pittance, the Commission or the Court, as the case may be,
will be disposed to protect it even against an attorney
whose devotion to the case is the sole basis of recovery.
It is a misdemeanor t circumvent this provision of the
statute.
Nor do the burdens of an appeal rest equally on both
parties. While there may be exceptions, the employer or
his insurance carrier can pay an attorney and the costs
of litigation, win or lose. Usually, the carrier's attorney
is on retainer; but we would not risk violation of profes-
sional courtesy to suggest that the only way to hold a
good retainer is to show a record of constant litigation
successfully handled, even at the expense of the poor devil
of a workman.
Extended review of cases of this nature shifts unneces-
sarily to the courts the burden of a task which is much
2S F.S. 1941, § 440.34.
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more efficiently performed by the Industrial Commission.
Assuming proper selection, training and retention of dep-
uty commissioners, the claims will be processed by experts
with a close knowledge of the aims and requirements of
the law and the conditions of employment within the
state.29 Compensation cases are sociological, economic and
medical in their implications, and not legal. Therefore, in
this and similar instances, the Judiciary should defer to
administrative experience. 0 "It was in 1877 that Justice
Holmes predicted that for the rational study of the law,
the man of the future would be the man of statistics and
the master of economics, rather than the black letter
man.""3
There are three solutions to the problem which the
writer deems to be deserving of consideration. The first
would be to amend the statute so as to make the deputy
commissioner's findings of fact conclusive if supported
by legal evidence. Another would be to eliminate one or
more of the present three appeals which seem superfluous.
A third would be to provide counsel at public expense for
a workman who has won the initial approval of the com-
mission. These three measures would be effective, whether
adopted singly or in combination.
The first remedy suggested would be to limit appeals
to questions of law. The findings of fact of the deputy
commissioner would thus become final unless it can be
said, as a matter of law, that there is insufficient evidence
to support them. This would accord no more and no less
finality to the deputy Commissioner's findings than are
29 See Whitfield, J., in South Atlantic S.S. Co. of Delaware v. Tutson,
139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675 (1939), as set forth in note 23, supra.
l0 For a discussion of the weight properly given to administrative
experience, see Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Cor-
poration, 332 U.S. 194, 67 S. Ct. 1575 (1947). See also Learned Hand, J.,
in Parke-Davis Co. v. Mulford Co., 189 Fed. 95, 115 (1911), who, after
settling a patent controversy involving discoveries in the field of applied
chemistry, a science of which he disclaimed knowledge, said: "How long
shall we continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and
authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one
knows; but all fair persons, not conventionalized by provincial legal
habits of mind, ought, I should think, unite to effect some advance."
31 "Case and Comment", Oct. 1947, pp. 18-21.
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now given to the findings of a jury or chancellor. This
is the approved procedure in cases arising under the
Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, the
constitutionality of which has been upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States.3 2 It is interesting to note that
the language of the Federal statute is identical with that
of the Florida act, and it has already been pointed out
that the Florida Supreme Court chose an alternative con-
struction to avoid conflict with a peculiar provision of the
Florida constitution." To avoid attack along the same line,
it would be desirable to vest final appellate jurisdiction
in the Circuit Court, as recommended below for other
reasons.
The second remedy would be to reduce the number of
appeals. Coupled with this, the courts having appellate
jurisdiction should be brought closer to the place of em-
ployment. Under present procedure, two trips to Talla-
hassee are necessary: one to appear before the commission,
and one before the Supreme Court. There are a total of
three appeals: first, to the Industrial Commission; second,
to the Circuit Court; and third, to the Supreme Court. The
appeal to the Supreme Court should be omitted. This would
give the Circuit Court final jurisdiction such as it now
exercises over inferior courts. A direct appeal to the
Supreme Court would be burdensome and incommensurate
with the small amounts usually involved. Making the
Circuit Court the final appellate court would not preclude
the Supreme Court from issuing certiorari to correct spe-
cial situations,34 such as a diversity of opinion between
several circuits, or a claim of constitutional privilege.
The appeal to the full board should also be eliminated.
In federal practice under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act, appeals go directly to the district court
32 See note 17, supra.
33 Atlantic S.S. Co. of Delaware v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675
(1939). See note 23, supra.
34 Certiorari lies to review "final" appellate decisions of the Circuit
Court in special cases. Florlo v. Colquitt Hardware Co., Inc., 33 So. 2d
722 (Fla. 1948). This point is discussed In South Atlantic S.S. Co. v,
Tutson, note 23, supra,
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from the deputy commissioner." Instead of reviewing
cases, the full commission by promulgating rules for the
guidance of deputy commissioners could supply the uni-
formity in administration which the present review is
designed to accomplish. If the Industrial Commission were
to promulgate arbitrary rules, or to exceed its authority,
the Circuit Court on appeal would so hold and disregard
the rules? In this way, a proper judicial control would
be assured.
The third recommendation is that the act be amended
to provide counsel or counsel fees for a claimant who has
won initial approval before the deputy commissioner. The
present statute requires the Industrial Commission to be
made a party to all appeals," but it does not appear by
counsel and participate. It should also be suggested, that
since the costs of administration are now charged to em-
ployers and their insurers,39 a nice appreciation of the
standards of fair play which define "due process" might
make it desirable that funds for this purpose be supplied
by the state.
Admittedly an injured workman is a public liability
and the proper object of a program of aid and rehabilita-
tion. Streamlining procedure to make relief prompt and
effective will advance the program already Undertaken.
Since the profession has not found it economical to handle
appeals, it may well ask whether it would not be better
in this field to furnish public counsel.
35 Sec. 21, Act Mar. 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1436; 33 U.S.C.A. § 921. See
cases cited, note 17, supra.
36 See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 67 S. Ct. 1575 (1947); compare sec. 10, Federal Administrative
Procedure Act of June 11, 1946; 60 Stat. 243; 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009.
37 F.S. 1941, § 440.27 (2).
38 Cases under the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act
are reviewed by injunction proceedings. § 21; 44 Stat. 1436, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 921. The deputy commissioner, represented by the Federal district
attorney, who appears to take an active part in the defense of the award,
is thus the actual appellee.
39 W.S. 1941, § 440.51.
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